Answer in brief
CVE-2026-63733 records a Medium severity (CVSS 4.3) vulnerability in SurrealDB: Writes in a PERMISSIONS clause bypass table permissions. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps surrealdb-core (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 4.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps surrealdb-core (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| surrealdb-corerust | <3.2.0 | 3.2.0 |
Published upstream
Sep 4, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 4, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 4, 2026
A `PERMISSIONS ... WHERE` clause is evaluated with permission enforcement disabled, so it can't recurse into its own checks. But the clause could also contain data-modifying statements, and these ran with enforcement still off — so evaluating a permission check could write to tables the caller cannot write. For example: ```surql DEFINE TABLE post PERMISSIONS FOR update WHERE (CREATE log SET at = time::now()) OR true; ``` Any user allowed to update a `post` now also creates a `log` record, even with no permission on `log`. The clause is evaluated once per matched record, so one statement can cause several writes. ### Impact Only databases with a `PERMISSIONS` clause that contains a write are affected; `FULL`, `NONE`, and read-only clauses are not. What an attacker **can** do: - With permission to perform the guarded operation (a low-privileged or record user is enough), write to tables in their own database that their permissions would otherwise forbid, by triggering an operation the clause guards. - Cause several writes from a single statement — the clause is evaluated once per matched record. - Trigger unintended events, cascades, or data corruption on those tables. What it **can't** do: - Escape the caller's own namespace and database — a permission clause cannot switch namespace or database. - Perform root- or namespace-level actions such as creating users; the caller's role still applies. - Read hidden data — this is an integrity issue, not disclosure. ### Patches Permission clauses must now be read-only: defining or importing one that contains a write is rejected, and any write attempted while a clause is evaluated is blocked at runtime, including writes reached through a called function. Read-only clauses are unaffected. - Versions 3.2.0 and later are not affected by this issue. ### Workarounds Users unable to patch should consider the following workarounds: - Review your `PERMISSIONS` clauses and remove any containing `CREATE`, `UPDATE`, `DELETE`, `RELATE`, `INSERT`, or `UPSERT`. - Limit who can define schema and vet imported data — such a clause must be defined before it can be triggered. ### Resources - [DEFINE TABLE … PERMISSIONS](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/table) - [DEFINE FIELD](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/statements/define/field) - `fix(core): reject writes in PERMISSIONS clauses and block writes during permission evaluation` (included in SurrealDB 3.2.0) ### Acknowledgements Thank you to [sondt99](https://github.com/sondt99) for reporting this issue.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.