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  4. CVE 2026 64273 input iforce bound the device reported force
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Back to active CVEs
High · CVSS 7.8CVE-2026-64273

Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect indexCVE-2026-64273

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-64273 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Jul 25, 2026Updated Oct 24, 2026Source checked Nov 16, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 14, 2026Material review Oct 24, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
High · CVSS 7.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
8 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Affected products and reported versions
ProductAffected versionsFixed versions
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*Not reportedNot reported
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:-:*:*:*:*:*:*Not reportedNot reported
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*Not reportedNot reported
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*Not reportedNot reported
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*Not reportedNot reported
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.12:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*Not reportedNot reported
Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <b1b79e89bc33e4c682d3df7ae2aadc62b5a0c310 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <d10b0507fa0f5b46764b178e3271f9012f2df677 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <6c0f2901c9d325d4a0574c4237fd507810d225ff || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <c21295616a8a52b9a5f18cd4ca8c73030eda3d4f || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <e5fa31f0550b55d80045669ae9080dd5b88abffa || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <70019779325f2bb5f5a4098e91e79c655f50fcef || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <a40250f97c312e000e3616c9074022311a0efbc3 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <0e9943d2e4c63496b6ca84bc66fd3c71d40558e2b1b79e89bc33e4c682d3df7ae2aadc62b5a0c310, d10b0507fa0f5b46764b178e3271f9012f2df677, 6c0f2901c9d325d4a0574c4237fd507810d225ff, c21295616a8a52b9a5f18cd4ca8c73030eda3d4f, e5fa31f0550b55d80045669ae9080dd5b88abffa, 70019779325f2bb5f5a4098e91e79c655f50fcef, a40250f97c312e000e3616c9074022311a0efbc3, 0e9943d2e4c63496b6ca84bc66fd3c71d40558e2
Linux/Linuxgeneric2.6.12Not reported

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to b1b79e89bc33e4c682d3df7ae2aadc62b5a0c310 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Jul 25, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 24, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Aug 14, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: iforce - bound the device-reported force-feedback effect index iforce_process_packet() handles a status report (packet id 0x02) by taking a force-feedback effect index straight from the device wire and using it to address the per-effect state array: i = data[1] & 0x7f; if (data[1] & 0x80) { if (!test_and_set_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) ... } else if (test_and_clear_bit(FF_CORE_IS_PLAYED, iforce->core_effects[i].flags)) { ... } The index is masked only with 0x7f, so it ranges 0..127, but core_effects[] holds only IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX (32) entries. For an index of 32..127 the test_and_set_bit()/test_and_clear_bit() is an out-of-bounds single-bit read-modify-write past the array. core_effects[] is the second-to-last member of struct iforce, so the write lands in the trailing members and beyond the embedding kzalloc()'d iforce_serio / iforce_usb object. data[1] is unvalidated device payload on both transports (the USB interrupt endpoint and serio), and the status path is not gated on force feedback being present, so a malicious or counterfeit device can set or clear a bit at an attacker-chosen offset past the object. Reject an out-of-range index instead of indexing with it. Bound against the array dimension IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX rather than dev->ff->max_effects so the check guarantees memory safety regardless of how many effects the device registered. A legitimate "effect started/stopped" status always carries an index below IFORCE_EFFECTS_MAX, so well-formed devices are unaffected; the neighbouring mark_core_as_ready() loop is already bounded and is left untouched.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-129
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Nov 16, 2026
References
8 linked sources
Open source record