Answer in brief
CVE-2026-65627 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.9) vulnerability in Decompression bomb via unbounded zlib:inflate in jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps potatosalad/jose (generic), potatosalad/potatosalad/erlang-jose (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.9. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps potatosalad/jose (generic), potatosalad/potatosalad/erlang-jose (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| potatosalad/josegeneric | >=1.0.0 <1.11.13 | 1.11.13 |
| potatosalad/potatosalad/erlang-josegeneric | >=a7746ecd4950f85a393136e449a91dac62b5c429 <857eb8e7f2d33e2c9ca2189e77226561cacaf2ad | 857eb8e7f2d33e2c9ca2189e77226561cacaf2ad |
Published upstream
Oct 26, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 26, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 26, 2026
Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token. The jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call. Decompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users. This issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.