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  4. CVE 2026 72889 netoauth versions before 033 for perl allow the
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Back to active CVEs
Critical · CVSS 9.8CVE-2026-72889

Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-72889 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Affected software not mapped in the current feed; confirm the named product and version against your inventory.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Aug 19, 2026Updated Aug 26, 2026Source checked Oct 3, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 19, 2026Material review Aug 26, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Record context

Vulnerability class
Secret Exfiltration
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-347, CWE-757
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 3, 2026
References
6 linked sources
Open source record

Key facts

Risk
Critical · CVSS 9.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
Not mapped
Fix availability
Not reported

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

Affected software not mapped in the current feed; confirm the named product and version against your inventory.

Recommended response

  1. 1Confirm exposure. Identify whether the named product or interface exists in your inventory, then review the linked upstream references for affected versions and vendor guidance.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Aug 19, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Aug 26, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Aug 19, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencedatatracker.ietf.org
  • Source referencedatatracker.ietf.org
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • Source referencemetacpan.org
  • Source referenceopenwall.com
Upstream source description

Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify. verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed. A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Related CVEs

  • OpenPGP data signature accepted from a signing subkey without cross-certificationAlso CWE-347
  • BLS12-381 key validation accepts a public key built on a foreign curveAlso CWE-347