Answer in brief
CVE-2026-88255 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.3) vulnerability in mpp Tempo keys its pre-broadcast dedup reserve on the caller-supplied transaction encoding, so a re-encoded signed transaction reserves a second slot. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ZenHive/mpp (generic), ZenHive/mpp (generic), ZenHive/zenhive/mpp (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ZenHive/mpp (generic), ZenHive/mpp (generic), ZenHive/zenhive/mpp (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ZenHive/mppgeneric | >=f8904666061fbab695874856d8fcd02c471dfe1b <e12bd4a1cea2e97c2a01fc059c48e5594a7b4a43 | e12bd4a1cea2e97c2a01fc059c48e5594a7b4a43 |
| ZenHive/mppgeneric | >=0.2.0 <0.16.2 | 0.16.2 |
| ZenHive/zenhive/mppgeneric | >=f8904666061fbab695874856d8fcd02c471dfe1b <e12bd4a1cea2e97c2a01fc059c48e5594a7b4a43 | e12bd4a1cea2e97c2a01fc059c48e5594a7b4a43 |
Published upstream
Sep 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 16, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 16, 2026
Improper Validation of Unsafe Equivalence in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to pass the Tempo duplicate-submission gate twice with one signed transaction. MPP.Methods.Tempo reserves the pre-broadcast dedup slot on the caller-supplied hex in reserve_hash_atomic/2, keyed through store_key/1 on tx.raw rather than on a canonical form of the transaction. The deserializer stores the caller's hex verbatim and accepts both recovery-id encodings, so one signed transaction submitted once with v=27 and once with v=0 yields two distinct reserve keys, and both pass the reserve and reach the broadcast path. The plug-level credential replay store is deliberately carved out for tempo in lib/mpp/replay.ex, leaving this reserve as the only gate, and the post-broadcast mark writes the canonical hash key that the raw-keyed reserve never reads. What the duplicate submission yields depends on the node: a nonce-reuse rejection fails closed, while a node that answers with the canonical hash for an already-known transaction returns a second valid Payment-Receipt for a single on-chain payment. This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.2.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.