Answer in brief
CVE-2026-92975 records a High severity (CVSS 8.1) vulnerability in Groundhogg <= 4.8.3 - Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation to Support User Identity Confusion. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps trainingbusinesspros/Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps trainingbusinesspros/Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| trainingbusinesspros/Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automationgeneric | >=0 <=4.8.3 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Oct 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 10, 2026
The Groundhogg — CRM, Newsletters, and Marketing Automation plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.8.3 via the `create_support_user()` function. This is due to the function identifying the support account solely by matching against publicly hardcoded constants — `user_login` `'groundhogg'` and email addresses `'[email protected]'` / `'[email protected]'` — where the `in_array()` email-equality check at line 238 is not a security boundary because any user fully controls their own email value. This makes it possible for an attacker with an account whose `user_login` is `'groundhogg'` and whose `user_email` matches one of the hardcoded support constants to have that account silently promoted to administrator — and additionally to super admin on multisite when the triggering administrator holds `manage_network_options` — resulting in full site takeover. Exploitation requires a two-actor flow: the attacker must first obtain or pre-plant an account with the hardcoded credentials (possible when open user registration is enabled or another account-creation path exists), after which a legitimate administrator must invoke the support-access feature via the `submit_ticket` or `process_send_support_access` entry points to trigger the promotion.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.