Answer in brief
CVE-2026-97597 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in ipv6: flowlabel: cap duplicate leases per socket. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <2f1a6dd5c80ceb902f50449efe899f29cd7918e3 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <467467bf4209f9f8add0c648bae763f92a0224c3 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <8d6cd188508513503805c156165de38e4e4a8615 | 2f1a6dd5c80ceb902f50449efe899f29cd7918e3, 467467bf4209f9f8add0c648bae763f92a0224c3, 8d6cd188508513503805c156165de38e4e4a8615 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 2.6.12 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 25, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: flowlabel: cap duplicate leases per socket ipv6_flowlabel_get() allocates an ipv6_fl_socklist entry for every successful GET. The recheck path for a compatible existing flowlabel links another lease without applying any lease admission check. Repeated GET requests for one shareable label can therefore grow a socket's lease list without bound. Reject a new unprivileged lease once the socket already holds FL_MAX_PER_SOCK leases. Check this on the shared recheck path so reuse of a globally interned label, including the fl_intern() collision path, is covered as well. New-label admission remains under the existing mem_check() policy. Use capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN) rather than ns_capable(), matching mem_check(). An unprivileged user must not bypass the cap by creating a user namespace and a netns where they have CAP_NET_ADMIN, which would still consume host memory. Check the capability only when the socket reaches the limit, so successful unprivileged GET requests below the cap do not generate a capability audit. Do the admission check before updating linger and expires so a rejected GET does not refresh the shared label, matching the existing socket-list allocation failure path.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.