Answer in brief
CVE-2026-98075 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=69c087ba6225b574afb6e505b72cb75242a3d844 <118212417ba0120d99f84154799f8880f07411f4 || >=69c087ba6225b574afb6e505b72cb75242a3d844 <d6c39774ae093c9f7009cc4ae918f18fc1af7ae7 || >=69c087ba6225b574afb6e505b72cb75242a3d844 <92f0bd0e2b632c6565ac2214a4d7d2ed37e5b9f6 || >=69c087ba6225b574afb6e505b72cb75242a3d844 <374b2c5561db80fcdd7cdce44af37a49416f61c7 | 118212417ba0120d99f84154799f8880f07411f4, d6c39774ae093c9f7009cc4ae918f18fc1af7ae7, 92f0bd0e2b632c6565ac2214a4d7d2ed37e5b9f6, 374b2c5561db80fcdd7cdce44af37a49416f61c7 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.13 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 25, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC reference to the main program fixups.c:jit_subprogs() rewrites BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads to contain real function addresses. This function is invoked from bpf_jit_subprogs() only when env->subprog_cnt > 1. Meaning that for any program like below: int main(void *ctx) { void *ptr = main; ... bpf_timer_set_callback(..., ptr); ... } The 'ptr' won't be ever converted to contain an address. In combination with e.g. bpf_timer_set_callback() this would lead to a function call at a bogus address. Instead of complicating the implementation, just assume that no useful program needs main to be a sync or async callback and reject BPF_PSEUDO_FUNC loads for the main subprogram.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.