Answer in brief
CVE-2026-98077 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix OOB read in sip_skip_whitespace(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=ea45f12a2766dae54e5426a23e8f4bafdbe2782e <60c012b2d05e1558b0f30ea3f15a2c3ca2f24d94 || >=ea45f12a2766dae54e5426a23e8f4bafdbe2782e <4be8380e3af008f418f97992c06f23be649a430d || >=ea45f12a2766dae54e5426a23e8f4bafdbe2782e <4a30aa2ba007db18210dd52219ecbd5528c03523 || >=ea45f12a2766dae54e5426a23e8f4bafdbe2782e <e8f8231824b5815f57ce62cba116e511b10196de | 60c012b2d05e1558b0f30ea3f15a2c3ca2f24d94, 4be8380e3af008f418f97992c06f23be649a430d, 4a30aa2ba007db18210dd52219ecbd5528c03523, e8f8231824b5815f57ce62cba116e511b10196de |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 2.6.26 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 25, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: fix OOB read in sip_skip_whitespace() sip_skip_whitespace() returns dptr unchanged when its own loop exhausts the buffer (dptr == limit), instead of NULL like its sibling sip_follow_continuation() returns on its own "no more data" path. ct_sip_get_header() only checks for NULL after calling it: dptr = sip_skip_whitespace(dptr, limit); if (dptr == NULL) break; if (*dptr != ':' || ++dptr >= limit) break; so a recognized header name followed only by spaces/tabs running to the exact end of the SIP payload, with no colon, makes the very next statement read one byte past the buffer. Make both "no more data" outcomes return NULL, matching the convention sip_follow_continuation() already uses and that both existing callers already check for.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.