Answer in brief
CVE-2026-98123 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in sctp: fix soft lockup from unpadded ASCONF-ACK parameter iteration. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <abf59d7f6fff23227256e8199aca5ade45758f8b || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <3be02999ab9131a4b96eb1eda4ca48b1cea80f03 || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <7ba84e2971d208a2d6413a334ec28a8a32cdce0f || >=1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 <2cb0b0b1ed69430bf73740377ea0a1c44c50db63 | abf59d7f6fff23227256e8199aca5ade45758f8b, 3be02999ab9131a4b96eb1eda4ca48b1cea80f03, 7ba84e2971d208a2d6413a334ec28a8a32cdce0f, 2cb0b0b1ed69430bf73740377ea0a1c44c50db63 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 2.6.12 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 25, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: fix soft lockup from unpadded ASCONF-ACK parameter iteration sctp_verify_asconf() walks ASCONF-ACK parameters with sctp_walk_params(), which advances by SCTP_PAD4(length), while the consumer sctp_get_asconf_response() iterates the same parameters advancing by the raw length, without padding. A single odd-length parameter desynchronises the two walks and makes the consumer interpret attacker-controlled bytes at a misaligned offset. When those bytes yield a length of zero, the while loop over asconf_ack_len makes no progress, spinning forever in softirq context, and the watchdog reports a soft lockup. All reads stay within the received skb, so the lockup is a pure remote denial of service. A remote peer can trigger it with a crafted ASCONF-ACK on an ADD-IP enabled association with an outstanding ASCONF (RFC 5061 section 4.1.2 requires the chunk to be authenticated, but the predefined empty key id 0 allows the peer to compute the same association HMAC from publicly exchanged parameters, so the gate does not help). The SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE case of sctp_verify_asconf() also performs no length check, letting a parameter without a complete error header reach the consumer, which reads errhdr.cause past the end of the parameter, an out-of-bounds read. Reject SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE parameters shorter than sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + sizeof(struct sctp_errhdr) at the verifier, and advance the consumer iterator with the same padding rule as the verifier to keep the two walks in lockstep. The verifier change guarantees a complete error header in every ERR_CAUSE parameter the consumer can see, so the consumer's asconf_ack_len check is dropped and it returns err_param->cause directly. The consumer padding fix is still required because odd lengths remain valid for SCTP_PARAM_ERR_CAUSE per RFC 5061. The issue was found by ZeroHive, a vulnerability hunting agent at Tencent Yunding Lab.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.