Answer in brief
CVE-2025-71392 records a Critical severity (CVSS 8.0) vulnerability in SurrealDB server-takeover via SurrealQL injection on backup import. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps surrealdb (rust), surrealdb (rust), surrealdb (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.0. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps surrealdb (rust), surrealdb (rust), surrealdb (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:a:surrealdb:surrealdb:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| surrealdbrust | >=2.2.0,<2.2.2 | 2.2.2 |
| surrealdbrust | >=2.1.0,<2.1.5 | 2.1.5 |
| surrealdbrust | <2.0.5 | 2.0.5 |
Published upstream
Apr 11, 2025
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 4, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 14, 2026
The SurrealDB command-line tool allows exporting databases through the `export` command. It was discovered that table or field names are not properly sanitized in exports, leading to a SurrealQL injection when the backup is reimported. For the injection to occur, an authenticated System User with `OWNER` or `EDITOR` roles needs to create tables or fields with malicious names containing SurrealQL, subsequently exported using the `export` operation The attacker could achieve a privilege escalation and root level access to the SurrealDB instance if a higher privileged user subsequently performs the `import` operation. Furthermore, applications using SurrealDB that allow its users to define custom fields or tables are at risk of a universal second order SurrealQL injection, even if query parameters are properly sanitized. This issue was discovered and patched during an code audit and penetration test of SurrealDB by cure53, the severity defined within cure53's preliminary finding is Critical, matched by our CVSS v4 assessment. ### Impact This attack can be used to perform privilege escalation and complete takeover (root access) of the SurrealDB instance, as well as being able to perform SurrealQL injection attacks against co-tenanted applications where SurrealDB is used as a shared backend for multiple applications. ### Patches A patch has been created that addresses the issue by fixing the bugs in the exporter which failed to escape some characters properly. - Versions 2.0.5, 2.1.5, 2.2.2 and later are not affected by this issue. ### Workarounds For SurrealDB users that are unable to upgrade, users that are looking to perform `import` operations must manually inspect the exported data for injected statements, prior to importing. ### Resources [SurrealDB Documentation - Export](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealdb/cli/export) [SurrealDB Documentation - Import](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealdb/cli/import) [SurrealDB Documentation - Authentication](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealdb/security/authentication)
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.