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Back to active CVEs
High · CVSS 7.8CVE-2026-89487

openvswitch: only skb_tx_error() a packet we are about to dropCVE-2026-89487

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-89487 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in openvswitch: only skb_tx_error() a packet we are about to drop. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Sep 11, 2026Updated Oct 19, 2026Source checked Oct 27, 2026First seen by HOL Sep 11, 2026Material review Oct 19, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
High · CVSS 7.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
3 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c <6767d70cf46f65807a6a4c4406a518e6c12e36ae || >=36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c <e41a59fc056f63a7a1f42788913c53cc48d744aa || >=36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c <5d85eef222cfd28e73deed7402c100229e8b9e6e || >=36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c <0dbc2398fca3bb33eda963849f865ddb1b3aa05e || c5f0c0e7525443add533495e93ba8de6feab2396 || 1674b4bf3eea3cac51b70778e89f8025f7cfe695 || >=3.10.51 <3.11 || >=3.12.40 <3.136767d70cf46f65807a6a4c4406a518e6c12e36ae, e41a59fc056f63a7a1f42788913c53cc48d744aa, 5d85eef222cfd28e73deed7402c100229e8b9e6e, 0dbc2398fca3bb33eda963849f865ddb1b3aa05e, 3.11, 3.13
Linux/Linuxgeneric3.14Not reported
Linux/Linuxgeneric>=36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c <5de5d554141a15b3f1f5c978fd9f7f4fd6d0600a || >=36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c <48db11e115d1b232edc5591604adc6eda95cd545 || >=36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c <4477222e2916a18e273edc139c955ade6bbb7a69 || >=36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c <4d5c460ef8754be1d43b16dbf02695b008b207d6 || >=36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c <6767d70cf46f65807a6a4c4406a518e6c12e36ae || >=36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c <e41a59fc056f63a7a1f42788913c53cc48d744aa || >=36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c <5d85eef222cfd28e73deed7402c100229e8b9e6e || >=36d5fe6a000790f56039afe26834265db0a3ad4c <0dbc2398fca3bb33eda963849f865ddb1b3aa05e || c5f0c0e7525443add533495e93ba8de6feab2396 || 1674b4bf3eea3cac51b70778e89f8025f7cfe695 || >=3.10.51 <3.11 || >=3.12.40 <3.135de5d554141a15b3f1f5c978fd9f7f4fd6d0600a, 48db11e115d1b232edc5591604adc6eda95cd545, 4477222e2916a18e273edc139c955ade6bbb7a69, 4d5c460ef8754be1d43b16dbf02695b008b207d6, 6767d70cf46f65807a6a4c4406a518e6c12e36ae, e41a59fc056f63a7a1f42788913c53cc48d744aa, 5d85eef222cfd28e73deed7402c100229e8b9e6e, 0dbc2398fca3bb33eda963849f865ddb1b3aa05e, 3.11, 3.13

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux, Linux/Linux.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update Linux/Linux to 6767d70cf46f65807a6a4c4406a518e6c12e36ae; Linux/Linux to 5de5d554141a15b3f1f5c978fd9f7f4fd6d0600a if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Sep 11, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 19, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Sep 11, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
  • Source referencegit.kernel.org
Upstream source description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openvswitch: only skb_tx_error() a packet we are about to drop queue_userspace_packet() borrows the packet skb -- it only copies it into a private netlink message (user_skb) and does not own it; on return do_execute_actions() keeps forwarding it through the flow's remaining actions. Its error path nevertheless calls skb_tx_error(skb), which via skb_zcopy_clear() does skb_shinfo(skb)->flags &= ~SKBFL_ALL_ZEROCOPY, stripping SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG from that live skb (skb_tx_error()'s kerneldoc says "skb must be freed afterwards"). For a MSG_ZEROCOPY skb carrying page-cache frags, SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG is what makes esp_input() skb_cow_data() before in-place AEAD; once it is stripped a later local ESP-in-UDP delivery decrypts in place over pages the sender does not own -- an unprivileged page-cache write (the "Fragnesia" primitive). do_execute_actions() ignores output_userspace()'s return value, so any action after a failed USERSPACE upcall inherits the stripped skb. Move the skb_tx_error() to the flow-miss drop path - the "default" branch of ovs_dp_process_packet()'s switch(error), before kfree_skb(). The call has been here since commit 36d5fe6a0007 ("core, nfqueue, openvswitch: Orphan frags in skb_zerocopy and handle errors") but was harmless until esp_input() began relying on SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG to gate in-place decrypt; only then did stripping it on a still-forwarded skb become a page-cache write primitive.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 27, 2026
References
8 linked sources
Open source record