Answer in brief
CVE-2026-89628 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in HID: picolcd: clamp eeprom debugfs read to bytes actually received. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=9bbf2b98ba11d00bd73e3254e15cfe17ccaff6ba <a3e6e8d7198a9f3861861520a38b673684a1062b || >=9bbf2b98ba11d00bd73e3254e15cfe17ccaff6ba <471f4a939c66d1d44aece2321807abf609fc9098 || >=9bbf2b98ba11d00bd73e3254e15cfe17ccaff6ba <699a3c8b56e168ca19d12722f3f5ef1d6f4b1d84 || >=9bbf2b98ba11d00bd73e3254e15cfe17ccaff6ba <e9c667395ac1f8024f623250b32bae4c7af9caa0 | a3e6e8d7198a9f3861861520a38b673684a1062b, 471f4a939c66d1d44aece2321807abf609fc9098, 699a3c8b56e168ca19d12722f3f5ef1d6f4b1d84, e9c667395ac1f8024f623250b32bae4c7af9caa0 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 2.6.35 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 11, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 11, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: picolcd: clamp eeprom debugfs read to bytes actually received picolcd_debug_eeprom_read() trusts resp->raw_data[2] -- a length byte supplied by the device in its REPORT_EE_DATA reply -- clamped only to the caller's read() count: ret = resp->raw_data[2]; if (ret > s) ret = s; if (copy_to_user(u, resp->raw_data+3, ret)) It never checks resp->raw_size, the number of bytes picolcd_raw_event() actually copied into the 64-byte raw_data[] of the kmalloc'd struct picolcd_pending. A device (or a spoofed picoLCD) returning a length byte of 0xff, read with a count >= 255, makes copy_to_user() read past raw_data[] into adjacent slab memory and return it to userspace through the debugfs "eeprom" file: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user Read of size 255 ... picolcd_debug_eeprom_read+0x214/0x2f0 [hid_picolcd] The debug-dump path in the same file already validates the device length byte against the received size before trusting it; this read does not. The file is created S_IRUSR (root-only) and a crafted device is needed, so it is neither unprivileged- nor remotely-triggerable. Clamp the copy length to resp->raw_size - 3 (the payload actually received, minus the 3-byte header), floored at 0 for short replies.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.